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European postal markets are to be completely liberalized by the end of 2012 at the 
latest. At the same time national regulatory frameworks are being adapted to the 
new requirements. The  extent to which the present monopoly suppliers will in future 
(continue to) be obliged to grant their competitors access to their network is also under 
discussion. In this respect the postal sector is often compared to the telecoms sector. 
However, the differences between the two industries are so great that regulation of 
telecommunications cannot be transferred to the mail sector. Obligations to provide 
network access and regulations on final prices in particular can scarcely be justified 
in the mail sector. The regulatory   strategy that should therefore be pursued during 
the liberalization process is one that places the minimal requirements necessary to 
create the best possible conditions for effective competition, for example access to 
address lists and PO boxes.
In Europe on 1 Ja  nuary 2008, Great Britain, Fin  land, Sweden and Germany fully 
opened up their postal markets to competition. The most recent European Postal 
Directive also requires all other Member States to fully liberalize their markets by 
the end of 2010 (for some countries by the end of 2012).1 This is the context within 
which further development of the respective national regulatory frameworks for 
the postal sector is presently being discussed. One of the key issues is whether the 
present monopoly suppliers will be mandated to grant competitors access to their 
distribution networks once the markets are fully open and be obliged to transport 
and deliver their competitors’ mail.
Vast differences between the mail and telecom industry
In the discussion about optimal structuring of market conditions in the mail sector, 
regulation of the telecommunications industry is often cited as a comparison. In both 
sectors there is a link due to their closely interlocked key roles in the information 
society and the liberalization of these network industries. Moreover, the former 
monopolists still possess extensive market shares. However, there are vast differ-
ences in the central sectors that severely limit direct comparisons.
1  Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and the advice of 20 February 2008 on amendment of the Di-
rective 97/67/EC regarding the accomplishment of the  single market for postal services in the Community. Official 
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Telecommunications networks, at least fixed land-
line networks, are physically permanent, intercon-
nected infrastructures like those found in electric-
ity, gas and water distribution networks. While the 
construction of these infrastructures is associated 
with very high, non-reversible (so-called sunk) ini-
tial investment, the costs of using the networks are 
relatively low. With telecommunications networks it 
is mainly connection of individual households over 
the so-called last mile that results in sunk costs when 
new infrastructures are constructed.actual usage. 
Basic charges to cover connection costs and related 
long-term contracts are generally not the norm.
The potential for competition in postal 
and telecommunications markets
By contrast postal networks are logical networks 
with nodes formed by mailboxes or post offices, 
the sorting centers and the mailboxes of the ad-
dressees. The sole link in these nodes is a process 
chain that comprises the activities of collection, 
sorting, conveyance and distribution of mail via 
a wide variety of transportation means (bicycles, 
road, railroad and aircargo). The cost structure of 
these networks is vastly different than that of the 
telecommunications sector.
Although the last mile in the mail sector is respon-
sible for the bulk of mail delivery costs from the 
delivery office (ZSP) to the addressees, this does 
not involve high sunk investment. Delivery to the 
addressee is based largely on work input and there-
fore mainly generates variable costs. The fact that 
the share of variable costs in a postal network is 
relatively high as compared to the total costs be-
comes obvious when one considers that, even when 
highly automated sorting centers are installed, la-
bor accounts for about three quarters of the costs. 
If mail is processed manually (as it usually is in 
developing countries and emerging markets), then 
the percentage of (variable) labor costs is consider-
ably higher.
Further differences between the postal and telecom-
munications networks result from the shelf life of 
the mail and the resulting real time requirements as 
well as the properties of the networks with regard 
to congestion. Unlike telecommunications connec-
tions, it is possible to store mail over a short period 
and additional network capacity (transport capacity) 
can quickly be supplied.
The different characteristics of telecommunications 
networks and postal networks are also reflected in 
the tariffs for use of services: While a monthly basic 
charge for connection to the network combined with 
different tariffs for usage is standard in the telecom-
munications sector, postal services are priced almost 
exclusively on the basis of 
The different cost structures in both sectors do not 
just give rise to different tariffs; their main impact 
is the stark contrast in the terms under which com-
petition in both sectors can develop.
The investment needed for entry to the telecom-
munications sector market leads to an entry bar-
rier, such that it is hard for competition to emerge. 
There is also the fact that the duplication of existing 
networks only makes sense, including economic 
sense, if there either capacity constraints exist or 
if new networks have new features such as higher 
transmission capacity.
By contrast there are few barriers to entering the 
postal service market. The high percentage of vari-
able costs means that it is relatively easy to enter 
and exit markets and networks can easily be rep-
licated. This also applies to areas where no single 
telecommunications supplier has previously been 
prepared to invest in appropriate network construc-
tion or development. The German Federal Network 
Agency confirms this when it states that, parallel 
to liberalization of the market, there has essentially 
been significant development of end-to-end-com-
petition (from collection to delivery) and complete 
area coverage with a “remarkably high number of 
license holders in the new Federal States” and that 
“the network coverage achieved there proves that 
provision by alternative suppliers is a given, even 
in structurally weak areas.”2 As well as the coopera-
tion of regional suppliers, contractors in the parcel 
segment already have a comprehensive network of 
branch offices that can easily be used for sending 
letters.3 In addition, since the Deutsche Post AG 
lost its exclusive license on 1.1.2008, the regulatory 
authority is expecting further expansion of the com-
petitors’ market shares as it was already observable 
in the years 1999 to 2006.4
The market developments observed lead to the as-
sumption that there is considerable potential for 
competition in postal markets everywhere. More-
over, to a large extent courier and express service 
providers or electronic communication media, such 
as telefax, e-mail or SMS for example, are able to 
provide substitutes for postal services.
2  German Federal Network Agency: Lage und Entwicklung auf dem Ge-
biet des Postwesens. Tätigkeitsbericht 2006/2007,46.
3  For example, Hermes, cf. German Federal Network Agency, l. c., 60.
4  In aggregate the number of people employed in the sector over this 
period easily rose from 194,838 to 196,266. Meanwhile the rise in peo-
ple employed by competitors more than compensated for the downsizing 
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Therefore the considerable differences between 
postal and telecommunications markets lead to dif-
ferent regulatory requirements. Within the European 
regulatory framework regulation is only justified, if 
the following three criteria are all simultaneously 
met:
High and non-transitory entry barriers exist, •	
there is no tendency towards effective competi- •	
tion within a defined time horizon, and
it must be ensured that the application of com- •	
petition law alone is  insufficient to address the 
barriers to competition.
Regulation in telecommunications
Telecommunication regulation is based fundamen-
tally on the consideration that there is no tendency 
towards effective competition because of the bar-
riers to market entry and that competition cannot 
be achieved without regulation. The key part of 
any network infrastructure regulation is the open-
ing of existing networks to possible competitors. If 
the latter can use the existing infrastructures, then 
there are significantly less barriers to market entry 
and competition will result in better use of existing 
infrastructures.
Although this consideration appears basically plau-
sible, there are a number of difficulties to bear in 
mind: from a conceptual aspect the access regula-
tions to existing networks will always reduce the 
value of new networks and investments. The extent 
to which existing networks are accessible might 
make it not worthwhile for competitors to construct 
their own infrastructures.
Access regulations face the problem that although 
they can guarantee effective use of the existing net-
works, in fact they not only reinforce the monopoly 
position of the present suppliers but also reduce 
incentives to invest in new infrastructures.
Experience from the telecommunications sector also 
shows that the implementation of access regulations 
poses a number of practical problems. If access 
prices are calculated on the basis of the total invest-
ment costs of creating the network (total cost), they 
tend to be too high as competitors must pay more 
than the costs they induce through use of the net-
work. If the costs of effective service provisioning 
provide the basis for access prices, the regulated 
company faces the risk that it can no longer cover 
its total costs. This may happen, for example, when 
the network has been expanded over time because 
of increasing demand which in turn might result in 
higher operating costs than with a new installation. 
The same also applies when costs gradually decline 
because of technological progress.
Finally, access regulations usually require additional 
interventions. As well as quali  ty definitions and 
regulations that guarantee equal treatment of all 
companies active in the market, the relation between 
access prices and retail prices must also be taken 
into account. In order to ensure effective market 
entry, regulated companies for instance must be 
prevented from setting their retail prices so low 
that they are below the access prices. The resulting 
margin squeeze would mean that efficient competi-
tors would no longer have any incentive to enter the 
market and the regulated company could secure its 
market-dominating position.
Overall this shows that, although access regulations 
can achieve efficient use of existing networks, they 
also involve relatively high regula  tory costs.
Access obligations in the postal sector
The basic op  tions concerning postal networks are 
access to the outbound mail centers (BZA), the in-
bound letter mail centers (BZE), the delivery of-
fices (ZSP), the PO boxes and delivery information. 
Regulations can only be justified where access to 
end customers is limited—similar to that in the tele-
communications sector. This applies to access to PO 
boxes and address lists, without which services such 
as redirecting mail are not possible and delivery of 
official or business mail to all receivers cannot be 
guaranteed. Access regulations to the mail centers 
and delivery points are justified only in very excep-
tional cases (such as in especially sparsely populated 
regions and areas which are hard to reach) because 
investment costs for postal networks are neither 
sunk nor so high that they prevent market entry.5 
The  advantages and disadvantages must certainly 
be balanced carefully and the question has to be 
answered, whether the actual and potential com-
petition is sufficiently intense to produce effective 
market outcomes. The competition from companies 
that offer re  latively close substitutes through other 
delivery services is of prime importance here.6
In Great Britain and the USA for example network 
access and prices are regulated. The outcome of this 
has been that, although competitors have entered the 
market, market entry has been principally at a loca  l 
level. There do not appear to be comprehensive of-
fers from competitors. On the other hand, the large 
5  Cf. De Bijl, P., Van Damme, E. E. C., Larouche, P.: Light is Right. Compe-
tition and access Regulation in an Open Postal Sector. Tilburg Lawand 
Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University, NL, 2005.
6  Inclusive suppliers of hybrid post, i. e. post that has been sent digitally 
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amount of competition in the non-regulated courier, express and parcel markets and 
the strong purchasing power of the large customers argue against such regulation 
or, moreover, that it should be phased out.7
In Germany, access regulation to the distribution centers (BZA and BZE) is based 
on § 28 of the postal act on the one hand which obliges the company with a strong 
market position to offer [part performance], on the other hand it is based on a deci-
sion of the Federal Cartel Office that discrimination between competitors and large 
customers is forbidden on the basis of the general competition law.8
There is high competitive pressure in the postal industry, especially in the business 
customer segment. Competition law and the ex-post supervision of end prices should 
be sufficient here with no need for sector-specific regulation. Possible regulations 
on final prices to protect the consumers should therefore be restricted to the prices 
of individual items of mail or even only be subject to ex-post abuse control.
Examples of such reluctance in the field of price regulation are to be found in Ger-
many where, price controls apply only to mail posted in amounts of up to 50 items. 
It is also to be found in Sweden where only the price of individual letter mail items 
is still directly regulated. In Finland there is no longer any ex-ante control;  prices 
for postal products are subject only to the requirement that they have to be “fair 
and cost-effective”, backed up subsequently only by ex-post control.
Conclusion
Postal markets are clearly different from telecommunications markets and have con-
siderable competition potential. In parallel with the full market opening, a minimalist 
regulatory approach should be pursued which confines itself to the same obligations 
to all suppliers (sym  metrical regulation) with regard to access to PO Box facilities 
and delivery information, e.g. redirection databases, and minimal price control. Apart 
from this, the competition authority should put in place effective abuse controls in 
order to create symmetrical terms for all market participants as far as it is possible 
and to create the best possible conditions for effective competition.
7  Across the EU 87.5 percent of the post from is dispatched by companies, only 12.5 percent by private individuals 
and microenterprises cf.  wik-Consult: Main Developments in the Postal Sector (2004–2006). Study for the European 
Commission, DG Single market and services, 2006,198.
8  German Federal Cartel Office Decision B9-55/03 of 11.2.2005 after complaints from competitors because they 
were not granted the same conditions as bulk mailers.